The paper brings out the special mechanism through which taxes influence bilateral FDI, when investment decisions are two-fold in the presence of fixed setup flows costs. For each pair of sourcehost countries, there is a set of factors determining whether aggregate FDI flows will occur at all, and a different set of factors determimnig the volume of FDI flows (provided that they occur). We demonstrate that the notion that the mere international tax differetials are a key factor behind the direction and magnitude of FDI flows is too simple. We argue that the source country tax rate works primarely on the selection process, whereas the host-country tax rate affect mainly the magnitude of the FDI, once they occur. We analyze international panel data with 24 OECD countries over the period 1981-1998 by the Heckman selection method to bring evidence in support of this argument.
Introduction
"European countries have been steadily slashing corporate-tax rates as they vie for foreign investment, potentially adding to pressure on the U.S. for similar cuts as it weighs a tax overhaul. Following the lead of Ireland, which dropped its rates to 12.5% from 24% between 2000 and 2003, one nation after another has moved toward ‡atter, lower corporate rates with fewer loopholes" (Wall Street Journal Europe, January 28-30, 2005).
Indeed, the economic literature has extensively dealt with the e¤ects of taxation on investment, going back to the well-known works of Harbeger (1962) and Hall and Jorgenson (1967) . Of particular interest in this era of increasing globalization are the e¤ects of international di¤erences in tax rates on foreign direct investment (FDI); see, for instance, Auerbach and Hassett (1993) , Hines (1999) , Desai and Hines (2001) , De Mooij and Ederveen (2001), and Devereux and Hubbard (2003) .
In this paper we attempt to provide a new look at the mechanisms through which corporate tax rates in ‡uence aggregate FDI ‡ows. Speci…cally, we assume "lumpy" setup costs for new investment. This speci…cation, which has been recently supported empirically by Caballero and Engel (1999, 2000) , creates a situation in which FDI decisions are two-fold: whether to export FDI at all, and, if so, how much. These decisions are pair-wise: that is, they are made by each source country with respect to each host country, as the "lumpy" cost is speci…c for each source-host pair.
In this context, the source and host tax rates may have di¤erent e¤ects on these two decisions. This is the subject matter of our empirical investigation, where we apply the Heckman selection method to international panel data of OECD countries.
The organization of this paper is as follows. The next section provides a simple conceptual framework for the analysis of the e¤ects of taxation on 2 two-fold FDI decisions. Section 3 presents the data and empirical …ndings. Section 4 concludes.
Source and Host Taxation
Elsewhere (Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004)) we emphasize the two-fold nature of investment decisions. In the presence of …xed setup costs of new investment, a …rm determines how much to invest according to the standard marginal productivity conditions. For this decision, the setup costs play no role. But in the presence of …xed setup costs, the pro…ts, that are generated when the …rm carries out the amount of investment called for by marginal productivity conditions, may be negative. Therefore, the …rm faces also a decision whether to incur the setup costs and invest at all. Thus, the investment decision of the …rm is two-fold: whether to invest at all, and if so, how much to invest. Indeed, in Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004) we provide evidence in support of this two-fold mechanism of investment in the context of foreign direct investment. Looking at aggregate FDI in ‡ows and out ‡ows among all potential source-host pairs of OECD countries, we …nd a large proportion of such pairs with no FDI ‡ows at all. Following the two-fold decision mechanism, we accordingly estimate jointly a selection equation (whether to invest all) and a ‡ow equation (how much to invest). The estimation results point out to the importance of …xed setup costs of new investments for the determination of aggregate FDI ‡ows.
Consider for concreteness the case of a parent …rm that weighs the development of a new product line. We can think of the …xed setup costs as the costs of developing the product line. The …rm may choose to make the development at home and then carry the production at a subsidiary abroad. This choice may be determined by some "genuine" economic considerations such as source-host di¤erences in labor costs, in infrastructure, in human capital, etc. But it may also be in ‡uenced by tax considerations.
In this context of FDI, there arises the issue of double taxation. The income of a foreign a¢ liate is typically taxed by the host country. If the source country taxes this income too, then the combined (double) tax rate may be very high, and even exceeds 100%
1 . This double taxation is typically relieved at the source country by either exempting foreign-source income altogether or granting tax credits 2 . In the former case, foreign-source income is subject to the tax levied by the host country only. When the source country taxes its resident on their world-wide income and grants full credit for foreign taxes, then in principle the foreign-source income is taxed at the source-country tax rate, so that the host-country tax rate becomes irrelevant for investment decisions in the source country. But, in practice, foreignsource income is far from being taxed at the source country rate. First, there are various reduced tax rates for foreign-source income. Second, foreignsource income is usually taxed only upon repatriation, thereby e¤ectively reducing the present value of the tax. Thus, in practice, the host country tax-rate is much relevant for investment decisions of the parent …rm at the source country. The relevance of the host-country tax rate intensi…es through transfer pricing.
To highlight the issue of source-host di¤erences in tax rates, suppose that the source country does not tax foreign-source income at all. Denote the …xed cost of development by c. Now, if the host-country tax rate is lower than that of the source country, then the parent …rm at the source country attempts to keep this cost at home for tax purposes. The …rm may thus charge its subsidiary arti…cially low royalties for the right to produce the new product. Thus, this cost remains largely deductible in the high-tax source country. Denote the (maximized) present value of the cash ‡ows arising from the production and sale of the new product by v( H ); as explained above, it depends (negatively) on the corporate tax rate ( H ) levied by the host country. Thus, the parent …rm will indulge into the project if
where S is the corporate tax rate in the source country 3 .
As is evident from condition (1), the tax rate in the source country, S , a¤ects positively the decision by a parent …rm in country S whether to carry a foreign direct investment in country H; whereas the tax rate in the host country, H ; has a negative e¤ect on this decision.
The amount of foreign direct investment is determined by the standard marginal productivity conditions derived from the maximization of the present value of the cash ‡ows of the foreign subsidiary, after taxes paid in the host country. Therefore, the tax rate in host country ( H ) has a negative e¤ect on the ‡ow of FDI from S to H; whereas the tax rate in the source country ( S ) is irrelevant for the determination of the magnitude of their ‡ow.
Empirical Evidence
Our economic approach is based on Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004), where attention is paid to the problems that arise when FDI ‡ows are "lumpy": FDI ‡ows are actually observed only when their pro…tability exceeds a certain (unobserved) threshold, as indicated by condition (1). Therefore, the Heckman selection-bias method is adopted to jointly estimate the likelihood of surpassing this threshold (the "selection" equation) and the magnitude of the FDI ‡ow, provided that the threshold is indeed surpassed (the " ‡ow" equation). 3 When the tax-allowed depreciation is close to the true physical (or economic) depreciation, investments are …nanced primarily by debt, then v( H ) may be approximated by (1 H )v 0 , where v 0 is the pre-tax present value of the cash ‡ows of the subsidiary; see, for instance, Auerbach (2002) , and Hasset and Hubbard (1996) . In this case, condition (1) is approximated by c[1 ( S H )] 5 v 0 , where we note that (1 S )=(1 H ) is approximated by 1 ( S H ).
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As was already pointed out in section 2, there are indeed H-S pairs for which no FDI ‡ows appear in the data (covering 18 years). This probably indicates that the FDI ‡ows called for by the standard marginal productivity conditions are not large enough to surpass a certain threshold level as the one described in condition (1), rather than that the desired ‡ows, in the absence of a threshold, are actually zero. The traditional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methods treat the no- ‡ow observations as either literally indicating zero ‡ows, and assign a value of zero for the FDI in these observations, or discard these observations altogether. In both cases the estimates are biased.
We employ 3-year averages, so that we have six periods (each consisting of 3 years). The main variables we employ are: (1) standard country characteristics, such as GDP or GDP per-capita, population, educational attainment (as measured by average years of schooling), language, …nancial risk ratings, etc.; (2) S-H source-host pair, characteristics, such as S-H FDI ‡ows, geographical distance, common language (zero-one variable), S-H ‡ows of goods, bilateral telephone tra¢ c per-capita as a proxy for informational distance, etc.; (3) corporate-tax rates 4 . Table 1 describes the list of the 24 countries in the sample, and whether they are observed in the sample (at least once) as a source or host country (but most source countries do not have positive ‡ows more than with few host countries), and Table 2 describes the data sources. The data employed in the empirical analysis are drawn from OECD reports (OECD, various years) on a sample of 24 OECD countries, over the period from 1981 to 1998. The FDI data are based on the OECD reports of FDI exports from 17 OECD source countries to 24 OECD host countries 5 . Table 3 presents the e¤ects of several potential explanatory variables of the two-hold decisions on FDI ‡ows. Our focus is on the role of the source and host corporate-tax rates.
But we naturally include in the empirical analysis a host of standard explanatory/control variables that are employed in studies of the determination of FDI ‡ows. We brie ‡y discuss these determinants …rst. They are analyzed in details in Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004). These variables includes standard "mass" variables (the source and the host population sizes); "distance" variables (physical distance between the source and host countries and whether or not the two countries share a common language); and "economic" variables (source and host GDP per capita, source-host di¤erences in average years of schooling, and source and host …nancial risk ratings). In addition, we include a dummy variable (previous FDI) to indicate whether or not the source-host pair of countries have already established FDI relations between them in the past; such past relations may have some bearing on the setup costs of establishing a new relation. As explained in detail in Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004), the OLS estimates of the e¤ects of these variables are biased. This is true for both the OLS-D regression, where the observations with no FDI ‡ows are discarded (leaving only 851 observations out of the 2116 observations in the full sample); and for the OLS-Zero regressions, where the no- ‡ow observations were recorded as having FDI ‡ows of zero 6 . Note that the di¤erence in the coe¢ cients between OLS-D and OLSZero indicate that there exist non linear relationships between the dependent variable and the independent variables. The Heckman method is suitable for estimating such non linear relationships. The Heckman joint estimation of the ‡ow and selection equations are presented in the last two columns. We exclude certain variables from the ‡ow equation for identi…cation. The results are more or less in line with …ndings in Razin, Rubinstein and Sadka (2004). For instance, a high gap in education in favor of the source country reduces the probability of having FDI ‡ows to the host country. This is expected because a gap in years of schooling may be a proxy for a productivity gap; see also Lucas (1990) . The host …nancial risk rating a¤ects positively the ‡ow of FDI, whereas the analogous variable of the source country is negative and signi…cant in the selection equation. Finally, the existence of past FDI relations is positive and signi…cant in the selection equation, as it may help to reduce the setup costs of establishing a new FDI ‡ow.
We turn now to the main focus of the paper -the e¤ect of corporatetax rates. First, the source corporate-tax rate is positive and signi…cant in the selection equation, as indeed predicted by condition (1) of the preceding section. This rate plays no statistically signi…cant role in the ‡ow equation, again in line with our analysis. The coe¢ cient of the host corporate-tax rate is indeed negative, although insigni…cant in the selection equation. But it is negative and signi…cant in the ‡ow equation, again as predicted by our analysis. Note that it is not merely the source-host tax di¤erential ( S H ) which is the main determinant of FDI ‡ows.
Interestingly, the role of the source and host corporate-tax rates is not fully revealed by the traditional OLS regressions. In the regression (OLS-D), only the host corporate-tax rate plays a statistically signi…cant role in reducing FDI ‡ows to the host country; whereas in the other regression (OLSZero), it is only the source corporate-tax rate which plays a statistically signi…cant role in promoting FDI out ‡ows from the source country 7 . Thus, OLS analysis does not detect a role for both tax rates to play in the determination of FDI. Note that the relationship in the selection equation between the probability (P ) of making a new FDI and the explanatory variables (including S ) is not linear. It is rather given by
where represents the e¤ect of all the other explanatory variables (held …xed at their sample averages), including country …xed e¤ects, and is the coe¢ cient of S in the selection equation. Note also that the estimate of is positive and statistically signi…cant. The marginal e¤ect of S on P is Figure 1 depicts the graph of the function P ( S ) for the U.S. as a source country and four EU countries (Denmark, Greece, the Netherlands and the U.K.) as host countries. The U.S.-U.K. characteristics in the sample are such that the estimated probability of a positive FDI ‡ow from the U.S. to the U.K. is one, una¤ected by the source country (namely, U.S.) tax rate. For all other three countries, the U.S. tax rate has a strong positive e¤ect in the relevant range of 0-40%. But the marginal e¤ects of the source-country tax rate is not the same for all three countries, being highest for Greece. Figure 2 depicts the ‡ow equation for the U.S., as a source country, and the four EU countries as host countries. The host-country tax rate seems to have a negative e¤ect at all rates, including the very high rates that approach 100%. Notably, the tax rate of the U.K. (as a host country) has a very strong negative marginal e¤ect, whereas in the tax rate of Greece has a relatively small marginal e¤ect.
Conclusion
We analyze the e¤ects of taxes on bilateral FDI ‡ows. Evidently, economists and pacemakers reckon with the fact that taxes do a¤ect economic international ‡ows of goods and capital. Bilateral FDI ‡ows are no exception. Our aim is to bring out the special mechanisms through which taxes in ‡uence FDI, when investment decisions are likely to be two-fold because of the existence of …xed setup costs of new investments. Speci…cally, for each pair of source-host countries, there is a set of factors determining whether aggregate FDI ‡ows will occur, and a di¤erent set of factors determining the volume of FDI ‡ows, given that they at all occur. We demonstrate that the notion that the mere international tax di¤erentials are the main factors behind the direction and magnitude of FDI ‡ows is too simple. We hypothesize that the source-country tax rate works primarily on the selection process, whereas the host-country tax rate a¤ects mainly the magnitude of the FDI, once they occur 9 . Analyzing an international panel data of 24 OECD countries, we bring empirical evidence, using selection bias methods, in support of this hypothesis. Source-Host Di¤erence in Schooling 
